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Abstract 
 
This paper develops an integrated risk management decision framework that provides insights in-
to the many factors that are involved in controlling and managing risk for accounting firms.  Bor-
rowing from the areas of insurance economics, crime and punishment, accounting, and organiza-
tion theory, factors are identified that affect the demand for risk reduction.  The interaction and 
application of three different components of risk reduction (market insurance, self-insurance, and 
self-protection) within the context of risk reduction decision-making are examined.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
he purpose of this paper is to develop an integrated risk management decision framework that can be 
used to evaluate and thus manage accounting firm business risk.  The development of a comprehen-
sive risk management framework is needed to address the many difficult issues facing the accounting 
profession today.  The globalization of the market place, advances in information technology, mergers of accounting 
firms and divesture of consulting, litigation activity and increased diversity in services offered are some of the cur-
rent trends underlying the issues facing the profession.  The change in the education requirements for professional 
accountants and increased academic research into risks (Simunic and Stein 1990, 1995; Huss and Jacobs 1991; John-
stone 2000) are attempts at addressing some of these issues.  However, the emphasis in accounting research has fo-
cused on auditing services, thus little attempt has been made to develop a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
risk management that relies on available literature in the field. 
 
As the accounting profession enters the new millennium it is confronted by a rapidly changing global econ-
omy producing new opportunities and new challenges while unresolved old issues such as independence continue to 
pose serious problems in the expanding assurance services market.  Accounting firms are responding to the dynamic 
environment around them by re-engineering all dimensions of the organization, changing the traditional functional 
organization to a customer group or industry focus, considering offering new services that expand the definition of 
assurance and others that address the growing electronic commerce marketplace, and considering the divesture of the 
consulting practice segment while maintaining a strong alliance between the spun-off consulting enterprise and the 
accounting firm.   
 
Thus many of the larger accounting firms now view themselves, after re-engineering, as "Consulting" firms.  
All of these changes suggest that large accounting/consulting firms are currently managed as a whole business, which 
suggests the use of an integrated approach to risk management over all service offerings and/or customer groups.  
Such an approach is necessary in order to understand the dynamic interaction of various risk related variables in firm 
practice management. 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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The problem with a limited or piecemeal approach to risk management is that not only may it fail to consid-
er all the factors that affect the demand for risk reduction; it also fails to consider any interaction effects.  If im-
portant variables and sources of risk are not given adequate consideration in the risk management decision-making 
process, optimal decisions will not be made in the financial and strategic management of the firm.  This has serious 
implications for long-term success. 
 
Long term success of any firm, including a professional accounting practice, is achieved by earning an ap-
propriate risk-adjusted rate of return.  By implication, risk and return are inversely related to the extent that higher 
risk opportunities produce a lower “risk adjusted rate of return”, ceteris paribus, while lower risk opportunities have 
the opposite effect.  This portfolio approach to the management of average risk is well accepted in finance, econom-
ics, capital budgeting theory, and to a limited extent by Simunic and Stein (1990), who propose control of overall 
audit client risk by viewing the client portfolio as composed of a statistical distribution of clients, each with different 
risk characteristics.  Thus, it is well accepted that long-term profitability is a function of revenues, expenses and risk.  
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest the importance of risk management to the accounting firm practice and to 
provide an approach for defining the portfolio risk as inclusive of all the service offerings of the firm, not just audit-
ing. 
 
The framework developed in this paper provides insight into the many factors that are involved in control-
ling and managing risk in a professional practice.  This study borrows from the areas of insurance economics, crime 
and punishment, accounting, and organization theory to identify factors that affect firm risk and thus the demand for 
risk reduction.  A framework is then developed to predict actions that a firm may take given a specific demand for 
risk reduction. 
 
2. Background 
 
 Accounting firms traditionally provide three major groups of services to their clients: Audit or assurance, 
tax, and consulting services. The business risk associated with each of these service areas includes loss of future in-
come, loss of reputation, and exposure to legal liability, as shown in Figure 1 (Brumfield et al. 1983). These risks are 
not mutually exclusive, thus a firm may have to deal with one or more of these risks simultaneously for a given ser-
vice offering, and in an interdependent manner when multiple services are provided to a single client. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Sources of Accounting Firm Business Risk 
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Of all the services performed by accounting firms, auditing has traditionally provided the highest visibility 
and is also the area of perceived highest risk, perhaps in all three-business categories.  However, research has not ex-
amined the relative risks associated with the offerings of tax and consulting services.  Thus, it is fair to say that ac-
counting research related to risk has primarily emphasized the audit segment of the professional accounting practice.  
 
To minimize the impact of litigation loss from user groups, firms can use a number of risk management ap-
proaches, including self protection, self-insurance, or market insurance.  Self-protection involves measures to minim-
ize the occurrence of litigation, including screening clients for riskiness prior to acceptance and continuation (Huss 
and Jacobs 1991; Johnstone 2000) ; McDonald 1997; Pratt and Stice 1994; Colbert et al 1996; Stice 1991; Walo 
1995).  Additionally, they can increase audit process costs (planning, testing, verifying, etc) and/or invest in extreme-
ly strong legal defense aimed at driving up the litigation cost of plaintiffs and thereby deterring the filing of lawsuits 
(Palmrose 1988).  Other means of self-protection include diversifying the client portfolio to reduce total risk and 
pricing expected litigation costs into their services.  After opportunities for self-protection have been optimized, 
firms can invest in self-insurance and/or market insurance.  Investments in market insurance often involve the pur-
chase of liability insurance from the insurance industry. 
 
 The risk management strategy pursued by a firm may involve the use of self-protection, self-insurance, mar-
ket insurance, or any combination of these three options, as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 
Risk Mangement Strategy Options 
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The actions taken by firm management are important because they define the characteristics of the firm.  
Decisions concerning the organizational structure of the firm, selection and training of personnel and level of in-
vestment in preventive measures are all critical in providing insights to the firm's attitude towards risk as implied in 
Figure 2.  Firms in areas X1, X2, and X3 may not be as risk averse as firms in quadrants X4, X5, X6, and X7.  Firms in 
area X5 are the most conservative in their approach to risk management, for they use all available options in manag-
ing risk. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the use of risk management by accounting firms to obtain an acceptable risk-
adjusted rate of return.  This paper will present a theoretical framework that examines factors that affect risk and 
thus, the demand for risk reduction.  This paper is organized as follows; the next section is the literature review; sec-
tion three presents the framework for risk reduction; section four discusses the implications of the framework, and 
section five presents the conclusions and possibilities for future research. 
 
3. Prior Research 
 
 The early approaches to modeling risk in accounting focus on the audit function, particularly on the risk of 
audit failure.  For example SAS No. 47 (AICPA, 1984) defines audit risk as "the risk that the auditor may unkno-
wingly fail to appropriately modify his opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated."    This risk is 
comprised of inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk.  Inherent risk is "the susceptibility of an assertion to a 
material misstatement assuming there are no related internal control structure policies or procedures" (AICPA, 1984, 
1988).  Control risk is the probability that a material misstatement will not be detected by the internal control system.  
Detection risk is the probability that audit procedures will not detect a material error that was not detected by the in-
ternal control system.  The early work on risk reduction focuses on audit procedures required to reduce or control 
these three risks of audit failure. 
 
 There are many problems associated with this approach.  First, it ignores the risks originating from the other 
service areas and thereby fails to recognize that the management of total risk from all service areas is the strategic 
objective.  Second, it does not capture the interaction effects of the risks in the audit client portfolio (Simunic & 
Stein 1990).  Finally, the steps involved in risk reduction (audit steps) in this approach are not directly observable. 
 
 An important contribution to the audit risk approach is the audit client portfolio risk perspective (Simunic 
and Stein, 1990).  In this approach, the risk of an audit engagement is viewed not only as a function of the inherent 
risk, control risk, and detection risk of the engagement, but also as a function of the risks of the existing audit client 
portfolio.  While this approach takes a broader and more integrative perspective to audit risk evaluation, it also fails 
to consider the interactive effect of the risks from other service areas.  Furthermore, the approach does not consider 
the impact of overall firm strategy on risk control. 
 
 Another approach historically used to evaluate risk is to limit consideration to the risk of litigation.  This 
approach focuses on the litigation exposure of accounting firms, and it arose because of the difficulty of directly ob-
serving the audit steps involved in the audit engagement.  Litigation activity of accounting firms is somewhat observ-
able and is used to make inferences about audit quality (Palmrose 1988) and riskiness of the audit client portfolio 
(Carcello and Palmrose 1994).  Generally, high(low) litigation activity allows the inference of low(high) quality or 
high(low) risk.  The problem with this approach is that litigation activity is a rough proxy for audit risk and audit 
quality because it assumes a perfect detection mechanism with costless enforcement.  Additionally, the approach im-
plies a limited view of risk, and does not capture the dynamic interaction suggested by the portfolio perspective sug-
gested by Simunuc and Stein (1990), or the framework presented in this study.  The risk of litigation is indirectly re-
lated to the risk of audit pricing which is the risk that the auditor will charge a price that is too low to cover the total 
cost of the audit.  Total audit costs include a resource cost component and an expected future (liability) loss compo-
nent  (Simunic and Stein, 1995).  The resource cost component is increasing in the level of auditor's effort, and is a 
function of the auditor business risk (Bamber, Bamber, and Schoderbek 1993), size, complexity, riskiness, and other 
client specific characteristics.  It is relatively easy to estimate the resource component cost, however, there is greater 
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uncertainty surrounding the estimate of the expected future loss component which is an ex post cost, the timing and 
amount of which are uncertain.   
 
 The primary control for audit risk is the use of audit procedures to reduce inherent, control, and detection 
risks.  However, Huss and Jacobs (1991) reported that audit risk is also being reduced by activities that occur outside 
of the audit engagement process.  Specifically, they demonstrate that client selectivity is another risk control tool to 
reduce or control overall audit risk.  Client selectivity involves the procedures and risk assessments used in deciding 
whether or not to accept or continue an audit engagement.  Analysis of evidence gathered from reviews of client ac-
ceptance/review policies and procedures revealed significant difference among the then Big-Six accounting firms on 
the importance placed on client selectivity.  This is an important extension of risk control, but like prior studies, it 
did not consider other risks nor the interactive effects of these risks across all activities of the accounting firm. 
 
4. Risk Reduction Framework 
 
Traditionally accounting firms have produced revenues and incurred risks from their three major service offerings, 
auditing, tax, and consulting.  As discussed earlier, the risk facing accounting firms originates primarily from these 
three service offerings, around which the risk reduction framework is centered.  The framework assumes that ac-
counting firm’s management is risk averse.  
 
The components of risk reduction are market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection.  When faced 
with the probability of loss, a firm can use one or any combination of these three options.  The following three sub-
sections discuss each of the components of risk reduction. 
 
4.1. Market Insurance 
 
Market insurance redistributes income and opportunities from well-endowed states (good cash-flow) toward 
the less endowed states (bad cash-flow).  In this paper, a less endowed state is one in which the accounting firm ex-
periences a significant loss.  Optimal decisions about how much market insurance to purchase depend on the price of 
market insurance, risk aversion, availability of self-insurance, and opportunities for self-protection.  If the probability 
of loss is high, and the amount of the loss is significant, then more insurance will be purchased (Linville 2000), pro-
vided that market insurance is being offered at actuarially fair prices.  If the market for liability insurance is relatively 
competitive, then the demand for market insurance should increase as the price decrease, and vice-versa. 
 
The attractiveness of market insurance prices to firms will be relative to (1) the pricing strategies of insur-
ance companies, (2) opportunities for self insurance and (3) the firm’s investment in self protection (Schlesinger and 
Doherty 1992).  Insurance companies that pool clients will charge a price that a low risk firm will consider unfair.  
However, the same price will appear actuarially fair or even better, to a high-risk firm.  A low risk firm may be a firm 
that has invested strategically in self-protection to minimize the probability of losses and has experienced a relatively 
low number of loss situations.  Given the existence of opportunities for self-insurance, a low-risk firm may self select 
out of the market for insurance.  It should be noted that this will only happen if the marginal cost for self insurance is 
less than the marginal cost for market insurance, given equal amounts of marginal benefit.  
 
4.2. Self Insurance 
 
Self-insurance, like market insurance redistributes income and opportunities from well endowed states to-
ward less endowed states (Ehrlich and Becker 1992) in order to reduce the magnitude of realized loss.  Examples of 
self-insurance are (1) an investment fund set aside to cover liability losses, and (2) participation in a self-insured 
pool.  Generally, a firm will self insure if market insurance is not available, the cost of market insurance is perceived 
higher than the cost of self-insurance, or the transaction costs or search costs for insurance is too high (Schlesinger 
and Doherty 1992).  High transaction costs might render market insurance too expensive for some risks for some 
firms.  Firms will self-insure if the search costs for insurers and obtaining information outweigh the potential benefits 
of market insurance coverage.  To self insure, a firm may set aside an investment pool to cover liability losses if it 
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believes it can get a better rate of return in the market place than the implicit rate of the insurance company.  Like-
wise, a group of firms with similar characteristics or objectives may self insure together if they believe they can do so 
at a lower cost than that charged by the insurance industry.  A number of low risk firms may form a group in order to 
minimize processing and administration costs of self-insurance.  This is likely to happen if the insurance industry is 
charging a price that low risk firms perceive to be too high.   
 
4.3. Self Protection 
 
While market insurance and self-insurance redistribute income toward states with losses, self-protection re-
duces the probability of these losses (Ehrlich and Becker 1992).  Thus, self-protection refers to the actions that a firm 
can take to minimize the occurrence of losses.  A firm will spend more on self-protection if the marginal benefits of 
self-protection exceed its marginal cost.  Benefits of self-protection include a lower likelihood of losses, an increase 
in quality reputation, and a lower cost of market insurance and self-insurance (Linville and Thornton 2000).  Costs of 
self-protection include expenditures on personnel, technology, organization structure, and job design. 
 
The amount a firm invests in recruiting, training and compensation of employees may be directly related to 
the likelihood of losses.  A quality personnel recruiting system, training program, and an appropriate reward system 
are essential for ensuring quality work.  Technology can also be used to manage risk through self-protection.  The 
choice of an appropriate and adequate technology can be used to ensure and maintain quality of work, thus minimiz-
ing the probability of loss.  For example, firms can invest in computing technology to ensure the accuracy and effi-
ciency of work performed by employees.  Firms can also use a highly formalized approach to their service process.  
For example, in a highly formalized audit environment, employees will have a checklist of tasks they have to perform 
and guidelines for most audit situations.  A less formalized approach will rely more on the professional judgement of 
the auditor in charge (Kinney 1986). 
 
 The choice of organization structure of accounting firms is another form of self-protection.  In instances of 
litigation loss, firms’ partners bear the risk of losing not only firm’s assets, but also the risk of losing their personal 
assets.  A professional corporation (PC) form of business organization can provide limited protection for partners’ 
personal assets in such instances (Linville and Thornton 2000).  Organization structure has also been identified in 
organization theory literature as a variable that impacts the effectiveness of the organization (Robbins 1990).  The 
manner in which a firm organizes its resources and employees will impact how effectively the firm discharges its ob-
ligations and how quickly it can react to changes in it's environment.  The organization of accounting firms as part-
nerships convey benefits of managerial discretion and wealth sharing, as partners bear the wealth effects of their de-
cisions.  The opportunity cost of managerial discretion obtained through the partnership form of organization is that 
owner/managers cannot take risk-reducing activities afforded through unrestricted ownership claims (Mayers and 
Smith 1992).   
 
 The organization behavior literature identified job characteristics as being important to performance and 
employee satisfaction.  Hence, job design is another tool of self-protection that firms can use to reduce risk.  A stra-
tegically designed job will have task characteristics that are congruent with the organization structure of the firm.  
This is necessary for the organization to be effective in achieving its goals and objectives. 
 
Given alternative organizational structures and task characteristics, firms can select an organization struc-
ture and job design that will allow them to effectively diversify risk through client portfolio and service mix diversi-
fication.  Firms will optimize risk through diversification if the cost of risk diversification is less than the cost of 
hedging risk through insurance (Mayers and Smith 1992).  Figure 3 depicts the action firms are likely to take given 
the relationship between price of market insurance and perceived riskiness of accounting firms. 
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Figure 3 
Interaction of Risk and Price of Risk Reduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Factors Affecting Demand for Risk Reduction 
 
 The factors that affect the demand for risk reduction are price, states of the world, and risk aversion.  The 
effect of price on risk reduction is discussed in the following section.  In this section, we examine the effects of states 
of the world and risk aversion. 
 
5.1. States of the World Expectations 
 
 The two states of the world assumed in this paper are a state where a loss
1
 occurs and one in which there is 
no loss.  The higher the probability that a loss will occur, the higher the demand for risk reduction, and vise-versa. 
 
We can make inferences concerning the expectations of either one of these states occurring if we know cer-
tain characteristics about the client portfolio of firms.  Characteristics that are related to the riskiness of accounting 
firm client portfolio include  SEC versus Non-SEC companies (SEC/Non-SEC); size of multinational corporations to 
total client portfolio (MNC/Portfolio); industries representation (Ind); and general financial condition of client port-
folio (FC). 
 
 These characteristics, separately and in combination, can be used to evaluate the litigation risk, audit failure 
risk, and complexity of tasks in clients portfolio.  Litigation risk originating from the audit segment is primarily from 
client and / or user groups.  While litigation risk in the tax and consulting segments originate primarily from clients, 
it is no less serious than the risk originating from the audit segment.  However, accounting research has paid very lit-
tle attention to the potential risk from performing tax and consulting services. 
 
Accounting firms providing services mostly to SEC companies have a higher exposure to the possibility of 
litigation losses than firms with clients that are privately owned.  SEC companies are traded on the national ex-
changes, and financial information about them are more readily available.  Anyone relying on this information is a 
potential plaintiff in a suit against the firm, thus firms with a significant portfolio of SEC companies have a higher 
probability of liability loss than firms servicing mostly non-SEC client companies.  The higher the probability of 
loss, the higher the demand for risk reduction. 
 
                                                          
1 Loss as used here refers to losses that are significant and material to the firm 
Price of Market Insurance 
High Low 
Form 
Insurance Pool 
Buy Market In-
surance 
Self-Insure or 
Market Insure 
Self-Insure 
High 
Low 
 
Accounting 
Firm Risk 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 18, Number 4 
 76 
Figure 4 
Risk Reduction Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 REAL OR TO-
TAL RISK 
PERCEIVED 
RISK 
RISK 
AVERSION 
PUNISHMENT 
PROBABILITY 
OF DETECTION 
PRICE OF MARKET 
INSURANCE 
PRICE OF SELF-
INSURANCE 
PRICE OF SELF-
PROTECTION 
DEMAND FOR RISK REDUCTION 
 
1. MARKET INSURANCE 
2. SELF INSURANCE 
3. SELF PROTECTION 
STATES OF THE 
WORLD 
The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 18, Number 4 
 77 
 Firms servicing large multinational companies (MNC) have an even larger exposure to liability loss than 
described above.  MNC are more likely to have a more diversified base of stakeholders and institutional investors.  
The size and added complexity of MNC add risk to the audit engagement.   The existence of institutional investors 
suggests that the work of the auditor will be under the scrutiny of sophisticated investors who have access to alterna-
tive sources of information.  Therefore, errors and/or fraudulent activities are more likely to be detected. Further-
more, litigation can originate from geographically diverse locations and is more likely for larger clients (Carcello and 
Palmrose 1994).  Consequently, the probability of liability losses is greater for firms with a relatively large portfolio 
of multinational clients. 
 
 The number and type of industries represented in an accounting  firm client portfolio also has implications 
for the probability of loss.  Generally, the greater the number of industries, the more diversified the firm portfolio.  
However, it should be noted that some industries are riskier than others, such as Insurance and Savings & Loan.  
However, a strategically diversified portfolio has the potential of mitigating exposure to liability loss. 
 
The general financial condition of clients has been used to evaluate the litigation risk to firms.  Some of the 
variables used to evaluate financial condition of firms that were found to be significantly associated with the risk of 
litigation (Carcello and Palmrose 1994) are probability of bankruptcy and persistence of net operating losses.  The 
more financially distressed the clients of a firm, the greater the risks of litigation and liability losses to the firm (La-
tham and Jacobs 2000; Latham, Jacobs and Kotchetova 2000). 
 
 The above discussion identified a number of factors that can be used to make inferences about the proba-
bility of a liability loss occurrence.  The higher the probability of a loss occurrence, the higher the demand for risk 
reduction.  This demand manifest in the demand for market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection. 
 
5.2. Risk Aversion 
 
The relationship between demand for risk reduction and degree of risk aversion is positive, ceteris paribus, 
as the degree of risk aversion increases, demand for risk reduction increase.  Generally, the more risk averse the firm, 
the more it will invest in risk reduction.   
 
As depicted in Figure 4, factors that cause firms to be risk aversed are perceived risk and punishment, in-
cluding the likelihood of detection.  Punishment can be in the form of fines, imprisonment, social sanction, loss of 
reputation, and other material economic loss potential.  Size of punishment refers to the severity of punishment.  If 
an accounting firm partner or employee is found liable for a business related offense, the punishment can range from 
paying a court imposed fine, imprisonment, revocation of CPA license, loss of reputation, and a significant reduction 
in post conviction income (John Lott 1990,1992).  The more appropriate the punishment and the larger its size, the 
more its deterrence effect on loss inducing activities.  Deterrence effects translate into investments in risk reduction 
that firms undertake to minimize the probability of occurrence of loss inducing activities. 
 
The effect of punishment on risk aversion is moderated by the probability of detection.  The higher the 
probability of detection, the more risk averse the firm.  The probability of detection is positively affected by the 
amount of resources that society invests in detection.  Society will invest more in detection if the social loss of the 
loss-inducing activities is great.  The greater the social loss of the activity, the more investment society will make in 
detection (Becker 1968). 
 
6. Demand for Risk Reduction 
 
The amount of risk reduction purchased by a firm will depend on expectations concerning the occurrence of 
various mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive states of the world; the price of insurance, firm risk aversion, op-
portunities for self-protection, and the availability of other substitutes (Ehrlich and Becker 1992).  For the sake of 
simplicity, assume that firms are risk averse and that there are two states of the world: loss (L) and no loss (NL).  The 
higher the expectations for L, the greater the amount of risk reduction purchased, assuming insurance is offered at 
The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 18, Number 4 
 78 
actuarially fair prices.  The factor loading
2
 of insurance prices will depend on competition in the market place for 
liability insurance, and the opportunities for self-insurance and self-protection. 
 
 The framework used to examine the demand for risk reduction of firms is based on the theory of demand for 
insurance developed by Ehrlich and Becker (1992).  The theory uses the state preference approach to emphasize the 
interaction between market insurance, self-insurance and self-protection, which are components of the demand for 
risk reduction.  In the risk reduction demand framework presented in Figure 5, factors that affect the demand for risk 
reduction are degree of risk aversion, price of risk reduction, and states of the world
3
.  We assumed that perceived 
risk and punishment are positively related to degree of risk aversion.  The effect of punishment on risk aversion is 
moderated by the probability of detection.  Market insurance and self-insurance are substitutes, while self-protection 
is a compliment for either form of insurance.  The two states of the world assumed are one in which a loss occur (L), 
and another in which there is no loss (NL).  If the market for insurance is complete, accounting firms can use market 
insurance to eliminate the financial risk of loss (Schlesinger and Doherty 1992).  In a complete insurance market, in-
surance will be available at actuarially fair prices, and a risk averse firm will purchase full coverage for all material 
risks.  However, in an incomplete market certain types of insurance may be too expensive and insurance coverage 
may not be available for certain types of risk.  In this situation, firms may prefer no coverage to full coverage.  To 
obtain optimal coverage in an incomplete insurance market, firms have to rely on a mix of market insurance, self-
insurance and self-protection. 
 
 We model the demand for market insurance as a function of (a) price of market insurance, (b) price of self-
insurance, (c) states of the world, (d) investments in self protection, and (e) degree of risk aversion. 
 
Dmkt =  f(a, b, c, d, e) 
 
The relationship between the variables in the model can be expressed as follows: 
 
 Dmkt     0,  Dmkt   0,  Dmkt   0,  Dmkt   0,  Dmkt   0. 
  a          b  c      d          e  
 
The above derivatives indicate that the demand for market insurance is negatively related to the price of market in-
surance, and positively related to price of self-insurance, states of the world, investments in self-protection, and de-
gree of risk aversion. The lower the price of market insurance, the higher the demand for market insurance.  The re-
lationship between demand for market insurance and investments in self-protection will hold if and only if insurance 
companies give better rates to firms investing in self-protection
4
. 
 
The demand for self-insurance is a function of (b) price of self-insurance, (a) price of market insurance, (c) 
states of the world, (d) investments in self-protection and (e) risk aversion. 
 
Dself = f(a, b, c, d,e) and 
 
 Dself   0, Dself   0, Dself  0, Dself  0, Dself  0 
   b       a           c           d           e 
 
The above derivatives indicate that the demand for self-insurance is negatively related to price of self-insurance, but 
positively related to price of market insurance, states of the world, investments in self-protection, and risk aversion.  
                                                          
2  The factor loading is the deviation from actuarially fair prices and covers claims adjusting costs and other expenses.  When insurance is of-
fered at actuarially fair price, the factor loading is zero. 
3  It is assumed that firms have a preference for a state of no loss. 
4
  In a study that involves eight of the major carriers of malpractice insurance for CPA firms, Linville and Thornton (2000) found that these in-
surance carriers offer significant reduction in premiums to firms that educate partners and staff about potential litigation pitfalls. 
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The relationship between the demand for self-insurance and investments in self-protection will hold if insurance 
companies do not give lower rates to firms based on increased investments in self-protection. 
 
 The demand for self-protection (Dsp) is a function of (d) price of self-protection, (a) price of market insur-
ance, (b) price of self-insurance, (c) states of the world, and (e) degree of risk aversion. 
 
Dsp = f(a, b, c, d) and 
 
Dself   0, Dself   0, Dself  0, Dself  0, Dself  0. 
   d         a  b     c       c 
 
The above derivatives indicate that the demand for self-protection is negatively related to price of self-protection, but 
positively related to price of market insurance, self-insurance, states of the world, and the degree of risk aversion.  
The relationship between the demand for self-protection and investments in market insurance will not hold if insur-
ance companies do not give lower rates to firms based on increased investments in self-protection. 
 
7. Implications Of The Framework 
 
 To provide a context for our discussion, we focus on the business risk likely to be confronted by accounting 
firms.  Accounting firms’ business risk can originate from sources internal or external to the firm.  Risk external to 
the firm are environmental risk, many of which are conditioned on the type of services offered by the firm, their 
clients, the user group for their services, their litigation environment, and their general business environment.  Risks 
that are internal to the firm can originate from the audit, tax, or consulting segments of the firm.  As depicted in Fig-
ure 5, certain risks are unique to a particular segment, while other risks may originate from more than one operating 
segment. 
 
 As depicted in Figure 5, areas X1, X2, and X3 represent risk that is unique to each operating segment with-
in the firm.  Areas X4, X6, and X7 represent risk that are common to two operating segments.  Area X5 represents 
risk that is common to all operating segments.  The management of these three different categories of risk will re-
quire a different approach.  Furthermore, the choice and adequacy of market insurance, self-insurance, self-
protection, or combination thereof will be dependent on the category of risk confronting the firm. 
 
 Another way to look at the nature of the risk confronting an accounting firm is from the perspectives of ma-
teriality and significance.  A material risk is one where the loss from occurrence of the risk is material in amount.  A 
significant risk is one where the occurrence of the risk has far reaching negative effects on the long-term success of 
the term.  In Figure 1, accounting firm business risk was described as comprising of loss of future income, loss of 
reputation, and exposure to legal liability.  A risk that would give rise to loss of future income, loss of reputation, and 
exposure to legal liability in a material amount is a significant risk. 
 
Figure 6 shows the interaction of various risks facing the firm.  The interaction of two or more risks 
represents areas of significant risk to the firm.  As depicted in Figure 7, area X5 represents the most significant risk, 
followed by area X4, X6, and X7.  Areas X1, X2, and X3 represent the least significant risk, relative to the other 
areas.  The management of X5 requires a different approach from the management of X1, X2, and X3.  Furthermore, 
the management of an X5 type of risk (risk from multiple sources within the firm) will differ from the management 
of risk that is unique to an operating segment within the firm (X1, X2 and X3 in Figure 5).  Finally, a risk of loss that 
is both significant and material in amount, and is common to more than one operating segment of the firm will re-
quire more management attention than other types of risk. 
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Figure 5 
Sources of Accounting Firm Business Risk 
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Figure 6 
Risk Significance 
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8. Implications for Practice Management 
 
 The implications of this approach to risk management for the management of an accounting practice are 
numerous.  First, risk must be managed on a firm wide basis and not on a segment, division or transaction basis to 
achieve a desired level of overall risk exposure and thus a desired risk/return relationship.  Second, the management 
control or information system must be enhanced to include all of the risk related variables pertinent to the practice in 
order for the optimal mix of self protection, self insurance and market insurance to be achieved. Third, "internal risk 
reporting" must be accomplished on a relatively "real time" basis in order to achieve the desired level of temporal 
risk so that the variance of risk assumed is managed.  To accomplish this, the management information system of the 
firm should be designed to capture and report on critical risk variables of the firm.  Finally, the risk management sys-
tem must be given the same level of emphasis as the financial reporting system of the firm. 
 
 The implication of an appropriate risk management system cannot be over-emphasized.  If a multi-
dimensional perspective is not used in evaluating company-wide risk, it is likely that critical financial variables may 
be omitted in evaluating the performance of the firm or various projects within the firm. 
 
9. Auditing Segment Risk Decision Model 
 
In this section, we introduce a variation of the risk reduction framework introduced above.  The framework 
introduced here is specific to the auditing segment of a firm, but can easily be varied to accommodate other operating 
segments such as tax and consulting. 
 
 As depicted in Figure 7, firms have three tools for controlling audit risk.  They can self protect, self insure, 
and/or buy market insurance.  The optimal mix of these three risk reduction strategies will depend on the risk per-
ceived by the firm, degree of risk aversion of firm’s management, nature and magnitude of deterrence effect of audit 
failure, opportunity for self-protection, and availability and price of self-insurance and market insurance.  These fac-
tors are depicted in Figure 4 and have been discussed in the previous sections. 
 
Management of risk in the auditing section of a firm is a dynamic process.  To illustrate, let us assume that a 
firm has a desired level of audit quality and risk that they strive for in an audit engagement.  As depicted in Figure 7, 
audit quality and audit risk are functions of auditor and client characteristics.  Auditor characteristics that may impact 
quality include size of the audit firm (size may proxy for depth of expertise), staff to manager/partner ratio, back-
ground and experience of the audit team, familiarity with the firm/industry, audit approach and technology.  Client 
characteristics that may impact audit quality include size and complexity of the client, sophistication of the internal 
control system, presence and composition of audit committee, and quality of management. 
 
At the end of the audit, or at some other designated time, the firm evaluates the attained risk level for the 
audit segment and compares this to the desired risk level.  If there is a variation, positive or negative, some action 
may be required.  If the attained risk level is greater than the desired risk level, the alternatives facing the firm is to 
do nothing (not a desirable alternative), invest more in self-protection, self-insurance and/or market insurance, or re-
duce risk in non-audit areas of the firm by adjusting their mix of client and/or service portfolios.  If the attained risk 
level is better than expected, the firm may do nothing or may consider saving money by reducing its investment in 
one of the three risk reduction components.  A firm that is active in managing its risk will go through this process of 
regular evaluation and adjustment on a continuous basis.  This process of regular evaluation and adjustment is a form 
of self-protection in itself. 
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Figure 7 
Accounting Firm Segment Dynamic Risk Decision Model 
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10. Suggestions For Future Research 
 
 Borrowing from the fields of insurance, economics, and crime and punishment, a risk reduction demand 
model is developed to examine the factors that affect the demand for risk reduction by accounting firms.  The use of 
market insurance versus self-insurance is examined using demand factors such as insurance price, firm risk aversion, 
opportunities for self-protection, and expectations of liability occurrence. 
 
 While the model developed is theoretical, it offers practical implications for the management of risk in an 
accounting firm.  Significant research is suggested from the development of the model, as little is known about the 
characteristics of providers of liability insurance coverage to accounting firms.  Little is also known about how ac-
counting firms manage risk for the firm as a whole.  Are insurers homogenous or are there significant differences be-
tween them that can reveal the riskiness of firms’ client portfolio?  Do they provide any monitoring function and if 
so, what monitoring function do they provide?  Given the litigation environment in which some accounting firms op-
erate, to what extent do insurance companies factor in investments in self-protection in liability insurance contracts?  
If investments in self-protection are considered in liability insurance contracts, what criteria are being used to eva-
luate these investments? 
 
 Another issue deals with whether there are differences in the completeness of the insurance markets for Big 
Five versus Non-Big Five firms, or international, national, regional versus local firms?  If the market is not complete, 
how do firms compensate for incomplete markets?  Do firms have a strategy to obtain the optimal mix of market in-
surance, self-insurance, and self-protection?  A related question in this area is whether some or all insurance compa-
nies pool all accounting firms together in setting premium rates or segment firms based on some riskiness criteria?  If 
insurance providers segment firms, what risk criteria are they using? 
 
Accounting researchers should study risk from the perspective of the firm as a whole with attention given to 
the different characteristics and mix of service offerings of various practice units within the firm.   The focus on the 
audit process as the primary risk control mechanism can fail to recognize the interaction effects of risk management 
in other areas of the firm and thereby produce unreliable results, i.e., an "audit risk" model can be limited by incom-
pleteness and the classical omitted variables problem.  An important starting point in accounting research could be 
an exhaustive investigation of the risk management practices presently utilized by large and small practices with var-
ious organizational structures.  Equally important might be an examination of the decision rules impacting the trade-
off decisions in selecting the optimum amounts of each component of risk control.  Another issue is how market in-
surers assess the relationship of the insurable risk to the total risk of the firm.  In other words, how are insurers ac-
tually determining the level of co-insurance present in any set of contracts?  
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